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Abstract 
 
 
The paper presents a conceptual framework of financial fraud based on the historical 
interaction of opportunity and impediment. In the long run the character of opportunity is 
determined by the technical characteristics of assets and their unique, unknowable or 
unverifiable features. Impediment is promoted by consensus about the real value of assets, 
such that through active governance processes, fraudulent deviations from real value can be 
easily monitored. Active governance requires individuals in positions of responsibility to 
exercise a duty of care beyond merely being honest themselves. Taking a long run historical 
perspective and reviewing a selection of British financial frauds and scandals, from the South 
Sea Bubble to the Global Financial Crisis, the paper notes the periodic occurrence of waves 
of opportunity and the evolutionary response of passive governance mechanisms. 
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Introduction 
To paraphrase Santayana’s famous aphorism, those who do not learn from history are 
doomed to repeat their mistakes. Yet historical mistakes are repeated perhaps most 
commonly in the case of fraud and financial scandal. To devise effective mechanisms to 
combat fraud, whether based on improved regulation or more efficient market mechanisms, 
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requires us to learn from past mistakes. Yet fraud seems to be the most perennial feature of 
business activity and its most intractable problem.  
The paper analyses the history of fraud and financial scandal and identifies some 
common features. To do so it develops a conceptual framework based on the long run 
interaction of technology and market development. These features lead respectively to 
problems of context specific asset valuation and value verification, which taken together 
define the environment of mispricing opportunities. Such opportunities do not in themselves 
lead to specific fraudulent transactions, but do influence the probability of their occurrence 
and their character. Thus, whereas particular frauds vary in terms of the specific opportunity, 
motivation and ex post rationalisations of the individuals involved (Cressey, 1953), historians 
might focus on the factors that make frauds more or less likely.  
A historical approach may accordingly explain why frauds and scandals tend to 
cluster in certain time periods. The paper begins by developing a conceptual framework 
based on the dynamic interaction of opportunity and impediment. It then presents a brief 
history of fraud and financial scandal in the United Kingdom, in three broad periods. The 
first, on manias and frauds before and during industrialisation, examines the features of 
frauds that became common in subsequent events. The second period begins by considering 
Victorian frauds and the notions of reasonable business behaviour and honesty as substitutes 
for direct intervention in corporation’s affairs, which have survived largely unmodified 
through a series of twentieth century frauds. The third details the period since 1980 during 
which time the process of financialisation compounded earlier circumstances leading to fraud 
opportunity, culminating in financial crash of 2007-2008. The final section draws conclusions 
referring to limitations of the conceptual framework whilst noting the value of a historical 
approach for the purposes of identifying the long run determinants of fraud and financial 
scandal. 
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Conceptual framework 
Taking a long view of financial fraud allows systemic causes to be more easily identified, 
leaving aside the psychological and individual circumstances surrounding specific cases. 
Most notably, frauds and scandals appear to occur in clusters, which are also cyclical in 
nature. The first of these, the South Sea Bubble of 1720, featured a large number of similar 
fraudulent projects. The same could be said of mispriced railway flotations of the nineteenth 
century, the accounting frauds in the UK in the late 1980s and in the US in the late 1990s, or 
the scandals that came in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008.  
Such intermittent clusters are suggestive of common features, based on the balance of 
opportunity and impediment. To structure our analysis it is useful to consider what these 
might be from a conceptual point of view. If we begin by considering any financial 
misdemeanour, a common attribute is the opportunity to mislead a third party about the value 
of an asset or collection of assets. Such opportunities are mitigated where there is agreement 
about asset value and such agreement is transparent. Note there are two conditions. The first, 
agreement about asset value is, for example, more difficult in the market for second hand cars 
and easier in for new ones. Newly produced cars possess a common cost base and uniform 
quality assured features. The second dimension complements these asset features, which is 
the transparency of the basis of agreement. New cars are more easily subjected to standard 
and independent testing, industry association kite-marking and warranty provisions. Second 
hand car values are less easy to verify, leading to individual but costly quality signalling, as 
in the famous ‘market for lemons’ argument (Akerlof, 1970). Price lists for second hand cars 
can be constructed on the basis of common and verifiable features, such as age, but in general 
verification of true asset value is problematic or costly and such assets present opportunities 
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for the unscrupulous seller, or demand additional vigilance, or activism, on the part of the 
buyer. 
The complexity of the asset, and the ability to verify its value, therefore present 
important challenges to those who would enforce financial fair play. Technological change 
alters the nature of net assets, and the character of future cash flows, either as a function of 
new assets with unknown properties or their effect on the obsolescence of existing assets. 
Technological change therefore poses a fundamental problem for accounting valuation. At 
the same time, the presence of information asymmetry creates the problem of dominant 
insiders, either as market operators, or senior managers. Note that the dominant insider is a 
function of market inefficiency and may exist even where technology is stable. Where 
technology is also dynamic, market inefficiencies are compounded. 
 From the perspective of history, technology and value verification have important 
properties. Technology can advance steadily within a given paradigm, or change suddenly 
through new, breakthrough, discoveries. In the case of steady advance, the market and market 
participants have the opportunity to value and refine notions of accurate value. In the case of 
disruptive periods of rapid technological change, the old rules of valuation no longer apply, 
and indeed established technology loses value suddenly through obsolescence. New 
technology is at the earliest phase understood by only a minority of innovators who may 
themselves be uncertain of market potential and therefore value. Mispricing opportunities, 
which might occur with or without fraudulent intent, are consequently more prevalent in 
periods of technological discontinuity.  
Value verification is similarly historically contingent. Early phases of market 
development impose limits on accurate pricing, for example where there are small numbers 
of buyers and sellers, thin trading and so on. Even so, market development through historical 
time and greater market depth do not in themselves promote market transparency. Over the 
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long run, there is what might be described as a process of ‘financialisation’ of society, in 
which financial market participants, financial institutions and financial elites gain greater 
influence over economic policy and economic outcomes (Palley, 2011). Such processes can 
be reversed, but also tend to reappear and therefore recur at different times in history, for 
example in the decades before 1914 and more recently with financial deregulation since 
1980. Features of financialisation that compound the problem of value verification include 
multiple principal agent relationships, differential access to information by elites and insiders 
and perverse incentives. Sub-prime lending prior to the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 
contained all three of these features. Financial obligations were packaged and resold, at a 
time when interest rates and market prices were subject to insider manipulation and 
accountants and ratings agencies subjected to incentives to produce optimistic valuations of 
complex assets. 
Drawing these concepts together leads to a general conceptual framework based on 
opportunity and impediment. As the discussion has so far suggested, technology and market 
development can be linked to the prevalence of fraud opportunity, but are themselves 
governed by broader exogenous factors. Nonetheless, each leads to the more specific issues 
of asset complexity and value verification. The interaction of these two features then gives 
rise to specific opportunities for mispricing, which include the technical characteristics of 
assets, the nature of principal agent relationships, the role of elites and insiders, and the 
effects of incentives. Conversely, from a regulatory point of view, each of these opportunities 
for fraud could be envisioned as an area for setting fraud impediments, using a variety of 
legal and institutional mechanisms. The relationship between opportunity and impediment is 
viewed as dynamic, with the former creating a reaction for the latter, which in turn is 
undermined by new sets of opportunity. To examine the interaction of these relationships 
through time, a specific country focus is required. The next section reviews the history of the 
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relationship, based on an analysis of selected leading cases from British business and 
economic history. 
 
A short history of financial fraud 
 
Manias and frauds before and during industrialisation 
The South Sea Bubble provided an early illustration of the power of insiders in possession of 
difficult to value assets in the absence of effective market scrutiny. At the centre of the 
scandal was the transfer of government debt to the South Sea Company, whose shares were 
then subjected to a speculative mania. The scheme was contrived such that all stakeholders, 
including shareholders, but also the government and annuity holders, had a collective interest 
in the share price increasing (Chancellor, 2000). The proceeds of share issues were used to 
fund dividend payments, with the intention of attracting further investment, so that the bubble 
had some of the features of a Ponzi scheme (Garber, 2001). Consequently, the lack of 
underlying value being created by the company and therefore the degree of mispricing 
became quickly obvious and the unsustainable share price collapsed. The victims of the 
bubble were those shareholders left with worthless shares and capital losses in the absence of 
any scrutiny, objective judgement or advice from market operators and institutions. For the 
first time in history, an auditor was employed to investigate fraudulent practices (Giroux, 
2014), and found that the directors of the company and also government officials, including 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, John Aislabie, were implicated in bribery and corrupt share 
dealing (Dale, 2004).  
The bubble extended well beyond the South Sea Company itself, and included a large 
range of “bubble” companies. In some cases these represented genuine investment 
opportunities where the value of the proposed investment could be easily verified. In most 
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cases however, either one of both of these features were absent. Some, for example Puckle’s 
machine gun, were based on apparently elaborate technical specifications, but which, by 
corollary were difficult for non-expert investors to verify. Others were difficult to verify for 
reasons other than technical specification, such as geographical distance, for example related 
to the exploitation of mineral rights or monopoly trading rights in overseas locations. Some 
were simply implausible, such as the proposed machine for perpetual motion. Many were 
bizarre, such as the scheme for importing jackasses from Spain in the name of a deceased 
clergyman (for these and other examples, see: South Sea Company, 1825, pp.70-84).  
The practical effect of these schemes was that the probability of future cash flows and 
profits could not be easily verified. Notwithstanding the development of discount-based 
methods, such as risk adjusted years’ purchase (Harrison, 2001), valuation was problematic 
because either the technical specification was complex or there was no practical way of 
verifying the existence and value of the assets being sold. A further complication was the 
pricing of calls on subscription shares (Dale, Johnson and Tang, 2005, but c.f. Shea, 2007). In 
such an environment, opportunities for fraud arose from the uncertainly of valuation of the 
underlying asset and the absence of agreed and transparent valuation methods. The reaction, 
which was to outlaw incorporation other than through charter under the Bubble Act of 17201, 
was not extreme in this respect, although it had wider ramifications for economic 
development. The regulatory reaction was reasonable in an environment where information 
asymmetries suggested in promotion schemes appeared beyond practical regulation. At the 
same time, information asymmetry and the lack of access to information for the typical 
investor significantly inhibited market efficiency and transparency. 
By the first half of the nineteenth century the situation had changed somewhat. 
Industrialisation brought common replications of technical solutions with standardised 
                                            
1 Bubble Act [1720] 6 Geo I, c 18. 
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components and units of output, which were increasingly common by 1850. Centralisation of 
production in factories reduced the opportunities for embezzlement that had prevailed in the 
putting out system, enabling the complementary functioning of surveillance and accounting 
controls (Toms, 2005). Increased scale and accumulated wealth also meant that joint stock 
based finance could once again be accorded legal legitimacy. 
The environment in which new companies were now allowed to operate, was, 
nonetheless, inauspicious. Railway promoters like George Hudson were at the centre of new 
scandals, once again exploiting a new wave of technology that was not well understood by 
investors. A contemporary journalist, David Morier Evans described the railway mania as a 
new alliance between dishonesty and financial sophistication (Wilson and Wilson, 2013, 
p.15). Cash flows expected from investments were not well understood, and uncertainties 
were compounded by the use of creative accounting methods. For example, uncertainty over 
the division of expenditure between capital and revenue was exploited by unregulated 
directors and company promoters (McCartney and Arnold, 2000). Railway companies would 
reduce their depreciation charges to justify dividend payments.  In turn, dividend distributions 
were instrumental in attracting new investors. In the absence of shareholder protection 
regulation, investors rationally demanded high dividend payments (Campbell and Turner, 
2011). Many of the investors had accumulated profits from unincorporated businesses in 
other industries, and notably included the cotton merchants and manufacturers of Liverpool 
and Manchester (Chapman, 2003, pp.103-104).   
As the state receded from interference, as in the first half of the nineteenth century, 
the risk of expropriation for minority shareholders increased. Sunk investments, like railways 
and manufacturing, require permanent capital and therefore restrictions on capital 
withdrawals (Lamoreaux, 2009) to protect minority investors and third party creditors. Such 
pressures placed limitations on dividends, whilst legal protection for minority shareholders 
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who might otherwise suffer from the domination of powerful insiders was minimal, as the 
judgement in Foss v Harbottle case demonstrated.2 By the mid nineteenth century, the 
dominant insider was well established, with decisive influence on value and its distribution.  
 
Victorian frauds and the origins of modern regulation 
Following the railway mania there were the beginnings of legal mechanisms designed to 
counter this dominance. Some re-regulation in the form of the Companies Act of 18623 
inaugurated improvements in shareholder protection. An important feature was the specimen 
articles of association that allowed limitations on directors’ power, such as democratic (one 
shareholder one vote) or graduated voting rights, voluntary shareholder audits, low thresholds 
(10 per cent) to exercise rights to call extraordinary company meetings and so on. These were 
relatively weak protections and investors therefore restricted directors’ power by structuring 
their incentives and requiring most profits to be distributed as dividends (Campbell and 
Turner, 2011). Although the features of the 1862 Act were permissive, their effect was to 
encourage shareholders to play an active role in the governance of their companies, for 
example using shareholder committees to conduct audits. The Act also promoted the use of 
private companies, which did not depend on raising capital through issues to the public 
(Watson, 2012, p.58), and therefore had less opportunity to mislead third party investors. The 
post 1860 environment consequently ushered in features of corporate governance that 
provided some protection to investors.  
Simultaneously the economy modernised further, but primarily though incremental 
improvements to the established coal and iron technological paradigm. Where technology is 
stable or incremental, the main opportunities from fraud come from market manipulations, 
such as market rigging or abuse of insider knowledge arising from market inefficiencies and 
                                            
2 Foss v Harbottle [1843] 67 ER 189. The court will not interfere with the wishes of the majority of members in 
a general meeting. 
3 Companies Act [1862] 25 & 26 Vict. c.89.  
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lack of transparency. In the 1860s for example there were cases affecting banks, including 
Overend Gurney, 1866, which issued a prospectus whilst technically insolvent and collapsed 
soon afterwards (Ackrill and Hannah, 2001) and also the railways and money markets. Again, 
these were subject to market manipulation style activities by insiders (Johnston, 1932), New 
legislation for railway accounting in 1868 failed to address fundamental issues of capital and 
revenue distinctions and associated valuation issues (Georgiou and Jack, 2011). Even so, 
there were no significant waves of corporate scandal in the period immediately after the 
reintroduction of limited liability.  
There were nonetheless individual and damaging cases. In the months before its 
collapse in 1878, the City of Glasgow Bank had been using company funds to purchase its 
shares, thereby deceiving investors about its true value (Acheson and Turner, 2008). The 
practice was declared illegal in the subsequent case of Trevor v Whitworth (1887).4 Following 
legislation in the form of the Acts of 1879 (Prosecution of Public Offences) and 1890 
(Winding-up),5 standards expected of directors became higher, such that criminal 
prosecutions of promoters or directors could be instigated by the Director of Public 
Prosecutions or the Board of Trade (Taylor, 2013). A distinction was made between the 
criminalisation of dishonesty and intent to defraud, and what might be considered normal 
trading transactions (Wilson and Wilson, 2013).  These mechanisms reduced the burdens on 
shareholders, who, with increasingly liquid markets and diverse portfolios, had less time to 
actively participate in company affairs, leading to a decline in shareholder activism. Even so, 
as a consequence, dishonesty might go undetected in the absence of responsibilities for 
vigilance in audit and other oversight functions. 
In the 1890s a new wave of technical progress based on electricity, tramways, the 
internal combustion engine, pneumatic tyres, cycles and oil presented opportunities for the 
                                            
4 Trevor v Whitworth [1887] 12 App Cas 409. 
5 Prosecution of Offences Act, [1879] 42 & 43 Vict. c.22. Companies (Winding Up) Act [1890] 53 & 54 Vict c 
63. 
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fraudulent promoter and challenges for the evolved legal framework. The career of broker 
and promoter Ernest Terah Hooley provides useful illustration. In 1896 he purchased the 
Pneumatic Tyre Company for £3m using borrowed money. He created a new board of 
honorary directors, with impressive aristocratic pedigree using financial inducements. The 
Earl de al Warr was listed as the chairman (in return, it was alleged for £25,000), and fellow 
directors were his Grace the Duke of Somerset and the Earl of Albemarle.6 None of these 
directors had any knowledge of the business of cycle or tyre manufacture, a pattern repeated 
across a series of flotations in the sector in the mid-1890s. Hooley floated the Dunlop 
Pneumatic Tyre Company for £5m one month later. The directors retained significant 
ownership through the use of deferred shares.7 Hooley had not created any value from this 
operation, but relied instead on inducements to journalists to publish favourable accounts of 
the firm’s prospects, benefiting from a wider boom in the promotion of cycle industry shares. 
These techniques were designed to manage investors’ risk perceptions (Harrison, 1980). 
Hooley used inside information about Dunlop licenses held by the Beeston and Grappler 
cycle companies, as part of a share rigging scheme, from which Hooley profited personally 
(Stratmann, 2012). Such details were unknowable to the investing public, particularly those 
relying on press reports. In such fashion, Hooley moved from one scheme to another, 
including the development of Trafford Park in Manchester and a plan to purchase Cuba. He 
was successfully prosecuted and served several terms in jail, each time returning, undeterred, 
to concoct new financial schemes.  
Notwithstanding these shenanigans, the balance between fraud opportunity, 
shareholder protection and criminal prosecution operated without significant modification 
until well into the twentieth century. Criminal prosecution mitigated the requirement for 
                                            
6 Dunlop Prospectus, 11th May 1896, Times Book of Prospectuses. 
7 Founders or deferred shares were shares held by directors (who were usually the founders of the company) 
which received no dividend until a pre-established dividend had been paid to ordinary shareholders, and 
sometimes they gave the holders a right to a high share of profits once the pre-established dividend had been 
met (Campbell and Turner, 2011). 
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direct shareholder vigilance, as did the emergence of the accounting profession in the late 
nineteenth century. The 1900 Companies Act made incorporation more expensive and 
demanded greater financial disclosure, resulting in a reduction in the number of publicly 
traded corporations (Lamoreaux, 2009, p.27). Prudent accounting promoted the rise of 
professional auditors to replace amateur shareholder committees. These safeguards did not 
however directly protect investors, and by offering advice, professional audit firms became 
complicit with management and inside investors, to the exclusion of small investors (Maltby, 
1999).  At the height of Hooley’s first round of share pushing in 1896, Lord Justice Lopes 
famously declared, the auditor is ‘a watchdog, not a bloodhound’,8 signalling the law’s 
limited interpretation of shareholder protection. Indeed the law took a favourable view of the 
insider trader, seeing their profits as a legitimate reward for risk taking, for example on the 
promotion of new companies, a situation that was tolerated until 1980.9 
Insiders exploited the situation, which gave rise to a whole series of scandals in the 
1920s. There were few major technological breakthroughs in this period. Indeed, the 1920s 
represented a crisis in the valuation of established technologies. As a consequence, the main 
opportunity for fraudsters was the exploitation of inside market knowledge based on the 
permissive regime for insiders, who indulged in market manipulations and mis-selling share 
issues. They included the recapitalisation of established cotton firms and newly established 
combines, none of which lived up to their prospectuses and often left innocent investors 
holding worthless assets (Higgins et al. 2015). Hooley was prosecuted again, this time for 
mis-selling shares in a relatively worthless cotton mill.10 Horatio Bottomley and Clarence 
Hatry promoted other notorious schemes (Johnston, 1934). The activities of another fraudster, 
Gerard Lee Bevan at City Equitable Fire Insurance, illustrated two important sources of 
power of insiders. The first was the use of associated companies to move funds to cover 
                                            
8 Re Kingston Cotton Mills, [1896] 2 Ch. 279. 
9 Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 401 
10 Jubilee Cotton Mills, Ltd. v. Lewis, [1924] A. C. 958. 
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losses. Hence Bevan transferred money to City Equitable from his stockbroking firm, Ellis 
and Company, and vice versa (Vander Weyer, 2011). The second was the lack of vigilance 
from his fellow directors, who were nominees and oblivious to the fraud. Moreover, the law 
upheld the view that their office imposed no such requirements of additional vigilance, only a 
duty of care to act honestly with a reasonable level of knowledge and skill.11 In City 
Equitable, as in Kingston Cotton, a standard of ‘reasonableness’ was wheeled out, in an 
environment where managers and auditors had strong incentives to limit the extent of their 
responsibilities. 
The Bevan case demonstrated that outside investors were extremely vulnerable to 
accounting manipulations by powerful corporate directors. In the absence of clear accounting 
rules and regulations, these risks persisted, and were well illustrated by the activities of Lord 
Kyslant in the Royal Mail Steam Packet (RSMP) case. Like the South Sea scheme promoters 
and George Hudson in the railway mania respectively, Kyslant paid dividends out of capital. 
He also used connections between companies to massage profits. By manipulating the 
accounts in this fashion, he went one step further than previous fraudsters. His main method 
was to use secret reserves to boost corporate income such that what should have been losses 
in 1926 and 1927 were reported as profits (Davies and Bourne, 1972). Kyslant then used 
these false accounts to underpin the prospectus for a new share issue in 1928.  
The RMSP case differed in some further important respects from earlier scandals. 
Kyslant had to rely on the auditors to accept the accounting manipulation, a problem that had 
not troubled Hudson or Hooley. His secret reserves scheme was also designed to evade a 
specific loophole. In the absence of enforceable accounting regulations on disclosure, 
including any requirement to publish a profit and loss account, the concealment of financial 
balances in secret reserves was acceptable under the law (Jones, 2011). Kyslant was 
                                            
11 Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co [1925] Ch 407. 
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convicted, but only on matters relating to the prospectus.12 Accounting remained largely 
unregulated even after Companies Act 1929, although disclosure requirements grew in 
successive Companies Acts from 1948 to 1967.13 
Opportunities to move and disguise assets, liabilities, income and expenditure that had 
been features of frauds like City Equitable were compounded in the 1960s by the 
development of the market for corporate control. Contested takeover bids and complex group 
structures provided important context for the fraudster. A crucial issue in takeover bids is the 
underlying value of the target company’s assets and associated opportunities for 
manipulation. When the General Electric Company (GEC) launched a bid for Associated 
Electrical Industries (AEI) in 1967, the directors of AEI overvalued their stocks and contract 
work in progress, with the result that a £10m profit was turned into a £4.5m loss, post 
takeover. The flexibility of accounting practice led to the establishment of accounting rules 
for the first time in the UK, with consequential establishment of the Accounting Standards 
Committee (ASC) in 1970 (Jones, 2011, pp.129, 486-487).  
The development of accounting standards became a work in progress for the ASC in 
the 1970s and 1980s. Meanwhile, the Slater Walker (SW) scandal, which broke in 1974, was 
facilitated, like GEC/AEI, by the lack of accounting regulation. SW also demonstrated further 
problematic consequences of the emergence of the market for corporate control. SW’s main 
function was the buying and selling of businesses, with the prime objective of raising its 
share price. Such transactions were often conducted in haste, with little knowledge 
demonstrated of the underlying business or their inherent value (Toms et al, 2015). SW’s 
chief executive, Jim Slater used creative accounting to present a rosy picture and increase his 
own reputation in the City. After the scandal, investigative journalist Charles Raw (1977, 
                                            
12 R v Kylsant [1931] 1KB 442. 
13 Companies Act [1929] 19 & 20 Geo.5 c.23. Companies Act, [1948] II & 12 Geo. 6. Companies Act [1967] c. 
81 
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pp.235-238) demonstrated the effect of creative accounting on profits and apparent value in 
the SW subsidiary, Crittall Hope Ltd. In addition to manipulations in individual company 
accounts, Slater used the complex group structure to hide liabilities and losses. His use of 
Ralli bank as his own banking division to underwrite the dubious assets of other subsidiaries 
created further opportunities to disguise the true position of the business in the short term, but 
ultimately left the group insolvent and at the centre of the secondary banking crisis of 1974.  
James Goldsmith succeeded Slater and commissioned accountancy firms Price Waterhouse 
and Peat Marwick to investigate SW’s finances and report to the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI). His motive was to prevent a DTI investigation (Raw, 1977, p.346). Only later 
did it become apparent that Goldsmith was Slater’s nominee.14 Slater’s manoeuvrings were 
indicative of new problems for regulation and oversight arising from the personal connections 
of the financial elite. SW also demonstrated the problems of valuing individual company 
assets, how those problems are compounded by complex group structures and how they are 
difficult to verify in the absence of accounting standards, corporate governance and effective 
regulatory scrutiny. 
Although the consequences of SW were serious, they relatively little effect on the 
governance of City institutions. SW certainly contributed to the establishment of the Roskill 
Committee and the creation of the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) in 1987.15 Moreover, the first 
legislation on banking supervision followed the SW case in an Act of 1979.16 However, the 
objectives of that supervision were not specified until 1997 (Foot, 2003, p.251). Indeed, the 
Slater Walker aftermath was a precursor for the wave of deregulation and the associated 
financialisation of the economy after 1980.  
 
                                            
14 HM Treasury Papers, Unwin to Bridgeman, 27th October, 1975. http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/slaterwalker_part1.pdf 
15 Criminal Justice Act [1987]. The SFO was accountable to the Attorney General for prosecuting criminal cases 
of fraud and corruption. 
16 Banking Act, [1979] c.37. 
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Financialisation and the financial crash 
From 1980, greater financialisation implied changes in the structure of financial markets, lack 
of policy control over markets and the concentration of power amongst a financial elite 
(Palley, 2011). The end of corporatism and dirigisme in Europe, withdrawal of the state from 
the management of firms, and the advent of laissez faire and deregulation led to waves of 
corporate governance scandals in Europe and the US (Lamoreaux, 2009, p.30). Resulting 
concentrations of elite power proved problematic for regulators, and also for the efficient 
functioning of transparent markets.  
These problems were well illustrated by the Guinness scandal of 1986. Insider trading 
had been a feature of the SW scandal and loomed large once again in the Guinness case.17 
The directors of Guinness and their associates, who included Wall Street financier Ivan 
Boesky, operated a share support scheme during the takeover battle for Distillers (Augur, 
2006). Guinness directors used the company’s funds to write cheques for associates to buy 
Guinness shares, thereby increasing the share price and the value of the share for share offer. 
Such practices were already illegal, based on precedent, and also new regulation against 
insider trading introduced in 1980.18 To be enforced these rules required the identification of 
connectedness between insiders and nominees, which established a high burden of proof for 
prosecutions. In the Guinness case there were successful prosecutions by the SFO following a 
long trial, but the connectedness insider trading rules were subsequently abandoned in 1993 
in favour of information access (Loke, 2005).19  
Guinness was the precursor of a further wave of accounting scandals and frauds that 
broke in the late 1980s. These included Robert Maxwell and Mirror Group Newspapers, 
Bank of Credit Commerce International, Coloroll, and Polly Peck.  Once again these scandals 
                                            
17 Slater had been convicted under s.54 Companies Act 1948 which prohibited the provision of financial 
assistance for the purchase of the firm’s own shares. 
18 Companies Act [1980]. 
19 Criminal Justice Act [1993], s.52. 
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revealed the problems of subjective asset valuation. Like RMSP and SW, in all these cases 
profits were reported immediately before the business went bust (Smith, 1992), and were 
compounded by the deregulated institutional environment and complex group structures that 
made verification more difficult. The Polly Peck case was illustrative (Jones, 2011). The firm 
expanded rapidly through a series of takeover transactions between 1982 and 1989. 
Accounting standards were in force, but nonetheless allowed the Polly Peck Chief Executive 
and main shareholder, Asil Nadir, significant opportunities to manipulate his firm’s accounts, 
particularly using the options created by foreign currency fluctuations in his group of 
companies. Nadir channelled funds via overseas subsidiaries to his private bank accounts, 
which he covered by overvaluing the subsidiary assets in the consolidated accounts. 
Polly Peck and other frauds posed serious challenges for regulators in the late 1980s. 
Roskill (1986, p.15) commented that serious fraud was one ‘in which the dishonesty is buried 
in a series on inter-related transactions, most frequently in a market offering highly-
specialised services, or in areas of high-finance involving (for example) manipulation of the 
ownership of companies’. Such frauds, Roskill argued, were beyond the understanding of 
members of the public and by implication, beyond the purview of jury trials. Instead 
regulation and oversight became voluntary, based on insiders sharing similar expertise.  
In the wake of Polly Peck, a new Accounting Standards Board was established, with the aim 
of tightening accounting rules. At the same time, with the 1992 Cadbury Report, there began 
a process of codification of practice in corporate governance (Jones, 2011). The process was 
only completed in 2003, with the creation of the Combined Code as a collection of self-
regulatory principles. 
Much of the Combined Code came too late for the Dot.com crash of 2001. Again, as 
with the South Sea bubble and the railway mania, new technology presented the markets with 
difficult to value assets. The decline of traditional manufacturing and its replacement with 
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new economy firms switched value decisively from the physical and tangible to the 
ephemeral and intangible in firms’ balance sheets. For these reasons, particularly in the US 
but also elsewhere, there was a retreat from historical cost based valuation in favour of 
market based fair value (Georgiou and Jack, 2011). New firms were, for example, priced 
according to website traffic forecasts rather than traditional financial metrics. These difficult 
to value assets left a deficit of trust between inside promoters and naïve investors (Dale, 
2004). The effect was to increase reliance on regulatory mechanisms. 
However the response to this demand was partial and based on voluntarism. New 
regulatory authorities, supplemented what later became the Combined Code. Most important 
was the Financial Services Authority (FSA). Established in 1997, under the Bank of England 
Act, the agency progressively embodied European laws aimed at restricting market abuse 
based on equality of access to information (Wilson, 2014). Post 1980 legislation on insider 
trading proved difficult to enforce because it relied upon detecting connections between 
parties, and was ineffective, as the Guinness scandal demonstrated. The information parity 
approach, which followed, further reflected European legislation, and relied on windows 
during which directors were barred from trading.20 Under the FSA, regulatory oversight was 
enforced through administrative sanction and fines, with less emphasis on prosecution 
relative to the US and more on cost effectiveness and the preservation of the competitive 
position of the City of London (Jackson, 2005). Leading investment bankers provided the 
necessary expertise to staff the agency, but to provide such expertise they were necessarily 
drawn from banking institutions that were ‘too big to fail’. 
Such compromises meant that regulatory bodies were subject to capture by the 
political and financial elites. A leading example was Versailles Trade Finance, a partnership 
of businessman Carl Cushnie, a close associate of Prime Minister Tony Blair and career 
                                            
20 Financial Services and Markets Act [2000]; Market Abuse Directive [2005]. 
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criminal Fred Clough.  Like Polly Peck, they exploited the latitude within accounting 
standards, in this case to inflate turnover and assets, thereby defrauding investors. Political 
favour had promoted the reputation of the company, whilst the Combined Code failed to 
prevent the operation of the fraud. As in the City Equitable case, Cushnie and Clough 
obstructed fellow directors, in this case the non-executives. The auditors, Nunn Hayward, 
were also implicated by the Joint Disciplinary Scheme (JDS) for turning a blind eye to the 
gross inflation of turnover through the use of fictitious insider transactions.21 These auditors 
lacked independence due to over-reliance of this relatively small second tier firm on what had 
apparently become a large client.22 
The Versailles case was relatively small beer compared to what had meanwhile 
unfolded across the Atlantic and the subsequent global financial crisis. The Enron scandal, 
and a wave of others including Global Crossing, Tyco and Worldcom, to some extent 
reflected the absence of the corporate governance reforms that had evolved in the UK during 
the period 1992-2003. Indeed, in the early 1990s, US business successfully resisted most of 
the recommendations from the Treadway Report on corporate governance, preferring a model 
where the firm’s internal hierarchy selected board members and monitored performance 
(Toms and Wright, 2005, p.248). The power of dominant insiders was therefore reinforced at 
a vital moment in US corporate history. 
However, as the Versailles case in the UK demonstrated, as did the Parmalat case in 
Italy, neither corporate governance rules nor EU directives on market regulation were 
sufficient to prevent significant frauds. The effects of the dot.com crash added to the impetus 
for stronger regulations, which were tightened dramatically in the US in 2003 with Sarbanes 
Oxley Act (Sarbox), and more marginally in the UK with further additions to corporate 
governance codes with the Higgs (Non-Executive Directors) and Smith (Audit Committees) 
                                            
21 ‘Nunn Hayward faces questions’, The Times, 8th April, 2003. The JDS was a created in 1979 by the 
accountancy profession for the purposes of professional self-regulation (Matthews, 2000, p.70).  
22 The Times, 10th June, 2004. 
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Reports (2003), and marginal changes to rules on auditor rotation after the Parmalat scandal 
in Italy in 2005. Notwithstanding these changes, the ‘watchdog not bloodhound’ principle 
established in the Kingston Cotton case remained, and indeed might be characterised as ‘see 
no evil, speak no evil’. In legal cases and auditing standards,23 auditors were absolved from 
specific duty to detect fraud. Instead the responsibility was placed directly onto the senior 
management through their administration of internal controls (Lee et al, 2009). History 
demonstrates clearly however, from the earliest scandals, that dominant insiders, themselves 
responsible for detection of fraud, were its most frequent instigators, a point demonstrated 
once again in the wave of corporate scandals of the early 2000s and the global financial crisis 
of 2008. 
Frauds were also facilitated however, by the nineteenth century principles that 
remained embedded in accounting and auditing standards. In the Enron led wave of scandals, 
the finger of blame was pointed at dominant senior managers. With attention focused on the 
individual scapegoats, lax accounting rules, it was argued, were not at fault. Features present 
in previous frauds and scandals were now writ large and indeed appeared to have become 
systemic. Asset mis-valuation was widespread, but occurred within the accounting rules that 
had developed through the various scandals since 1980, and indeed the significant tightening 
post Sarbox and Combined Code. As in the South Sea Bubble, the railway scandals and the 
dot.com bust, new difficult to value assets posed a new set of problems for valuation 
specialists and a new set of opportunities for market manipulators. Financial derivatives, 
including options, futures and swaps, but also complex combinations of these were valued by 
mathematical algorithms. Their complexity posed problems even for their developers, as the 
$4.6bn bail out of the Long Term Capital Management hedge fund in 1998 revealed. The 
firm’s directors included Myron Scholes and Robert Merton who had been instrumental in 
                                            
23 Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465; Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 
UKHL 2; International Standard on Auditing 240, ‘Auditors’ Responsibilities Relating to Fraud in an Audit of 
Financial Statements’ (APB, 2010). 
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creating derivative valuation models (Lowenstein, 2000). To be accurate these models needed 
deep markets and frequent trading data as their inputs. Many of the more complex 
derivatives, such as collaterised debt obligations were, however, traded over the counter on a 
bilateral basis. In the absence of market values, accountants resorted to valuation models 
based on often heroically optimistic assumptions (Toms, 2015).  
As in previous decades, regulators were slow to catch up. New regulations tended to 
follow in the wake of scandals rather than anticipate their effects. In 2007-2008 and the 
aftermath, the effect was catastrophic. Expanded and deeper capital markets did not guarantee 
market efficiency or transparency. Instead, deregulation and financialisation empowered 
corporate insiders, who were only weakly counteracted by restrictions on their activities. The 
scale of the moral hazard problem was compounded by bank executive incentives, which 
were associated with bonus scheme complexity and bank profits, but not the level of risk 
exposure (Bruce and Skovoroda, 2013). Under such circumstances, ‘reasonable behaviour’ 
might be conflated with opportunities to engage in risky lending to achieve growth and 
shareholder returns. 
Ahead of the failure of Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) in 2008, as in the South Sea 
Bubble, all major stakeholders stood to gain from growth through further risky lending, 
whether executives receiving bonuses, shareholders increasing their wealth, and non 
executives and regulators drawn from senior positions in the Banking industry, credulous 
about the responsible behaviour of everyone else (Bank of England, 2015, for example, 
pp.217-222).24 For some of the period immediately before the crisis, James Crosby was both 
HBOS Chief Executive and a member of the FSA board. Although the accounts stated that 
the ‘performance and effectiveness of the Board and each of its Committees is evaluated 
annually’, there was no evidence of such reviews having been carried out by the Chairman 
                                            
24  Bank of England, for example pp.217-222.  
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and Non Executive Directors in line with the Combined Code on corporate governance. In 
their reports, the auditors, KPMG, referred frequently to the ‘reasonable’ nature of the firms 
risk policies and disclosures. Individual executives themselves did what was reasonable, but 
were not incentivised to challenge the reasonableness of others (Bank of England, 2015, 
pp.33, 175, 189-192, 217-218). In short, oversight amounted to a collection of ‘watchdogs’ 
with strict tunnel vision, such that resulting blind spots undermined collective responsibility. 
During this time, the FSA’s regulatory policy was to rely on out of court processes 
and administrative fines, thereby attracting criticism for failure to prosecute frauds involving 
pension and endowment mis-selling, or to effectively police individual financial institutions 
like Northern Rock. An important reason was that the burden of proof in complex cases 
required even greater levels of expertise than noted by Roskill two decades earlier.  
Prosecution was therefore expensive and risky (Croal, 2004, p.48; Wilson and Wilson, 2013). 
At the same time, voluntary codes of corporate social responsibility, third party regulatory 
agencies and multi-national firms whose activities span individual state jurisdictions have led 
to the rise of “private regulation” (Bakan, 2015). Even where investigations were pursued, for 
example HSBC was investigated for permitting money laundering involving Mexican drug 
cartels and terrorist organizations, criminal prosecutions were deferred in favour of fines, in 
this case at the instigation of senior politicians.25 Private sector interests were conflated with 
the policy process through regulatory capture, applying apolitical transnational standards 
through informal governance processes (Tsingou, 2010, p.5). Difficult to value assets, then, 
coupled with misplaced incentives for insiders and their capture of the regulatory process 
created significant opportunities for fraud during and after the financial crisis.  
Complexity, as before, benefitted insiders, particularly market operators. Market 
rigging scandals occurred on a regular basis. In the UK, the LIBOR rate and FOREX markets 
                                            
25 Breitbart, 20th April 2015 
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were subject to serious and fraudulent manipulations market insiders. The FOREX scandal 
was operated by a cartel of senior traders (“the bandits’ club”), with significant influences in 
the Bank of England, using inside information about client positions against the setting of 
market exchange rates for daily publication carried out at 4pm (Fields, 2014). There was no 
statutory monitoring of their activities. For example WM, the private organisation 
administering the ‘4pm fix’ was outside any regulatory authority, and the changes introduced 
in the wake of LIBOR had not been applied to FOREX (O’Brien, 2014). In short, the traders 
were operating a complex transaction that was poorly understood by outsiders and subjected 
only to voluntary codes of regulation.  
 
Conclusions 
The above discussion has been wide ranging and has necessarily been selective in its choices 
of illustrative cases. Also missing has been any analysis of counter arguments against 
regulation, which has been implied throughout to be desirable. Certainly in the model 
presented here, the cat and mouse evolution of opportunity and impediment is suggestive of 
the reduction of the former and the enhancement of the latter. However, without 
technological advances from which opportunity arises, economic growth is compromised and 
likewise too much regulation potentially damages market efficiency. In this view, fraud is a 
by-product of an otherwise successful market economy, and is to be tolerated as such. To be 
sustainable, this perspective must show that the costs of fraud are sufficiently small and that 
the economy is successful notwithstanding its presence. However, where fraud damages the 
reputational capital of individual firms, the write offs are potentially larger than the 
conventionally accumulated capital arising from normal trading. Where systemic, the loss of 
reputation spreads to institutions. The combined effects of fraud can thus significantly raise 
the cost of capital for all firms and damage economic growth.  
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As a consequence, the effect of the financial crisis has increased the demand for 
historical studies such that lessons can be learned and recent mistakes prevented. In the cases 
illustrated, the regulatory institutions have tended to lag the opportunities presented to 
fraudsters. The Bubble Act was ex-post the speculation, railway mania attracted railway 
regulation, Slater Walker led to the SFO. In the long run, and in more recent decades, 
regulatory impediments have been watered down, mainly as a result of reduced expectations 
placed on senior managers, auditors and market insiders.  
The lessons of history are clear. The criminal law has throughout most of history, 
punished dishonesty yes, but without imposing responsibility for its detection on senior staff 
within business organisations. Like everyone else, senior managers are expected to behave 
reasonably and exercise a duty of case, but if someone acts dishonestly, that need be of no 
direct concern to them, if they can show themselves to have acted honestly. No one is 
therefore expected to explicitly check for the dishonesty of others. However, this collective 
action problem compounds moral hazard problems resulting in a multiplication of 
opportunity with absence of impediment. Such problems have been most pronounced in 
periods of rapid technological changes, which have also coincided with deregulation. Their 
coincidence is most pronounced today, even post financial crisis. Many of history’s 
apparently obvious lessons remain to be learned. 
A balance is thus required, not just between the costs of fraud against the costs of 
regulation, but between the dominant narrative of deregulation and a counter narrative 
suggesting duties for regulators and high paid executives that might go beyond what is 
expected of the ordinary businessman or woman. Board members, in return for high salaries, 
should expect rigorous and frequent challenge, taking full responsibility for those in their 
charge as well as for their own behaviour. In other words, active governance; ‘bloodhounds’ 
are needed as well as ‘watchdogs’. 
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